Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2-2014

Common and Uncommon Families in the American Constitutional
Order
Linda C. McClain
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Linda C. McClain, Common and Uncommon Families in the American Constitutional Order, 67 Vanderbilt
Law Review En Banc 19 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/231

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by Scholarly Commons at Boston University
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
For more information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

COMMON
O
AND
A
UNC
COMMON
N FAMIL
LIES AND
D
THE AMER
RICAN CONSTITU
O
UTIONAL
L ORDER
R
67 Van
nderbilt Law Review En B
Banc 19 (20014)
Boston Univversity School of Law Pu
ublic Law & Legal Theoory Paper Noo. 14-19
(May 7, 2014)

Linda
a C. McCla
ain
ool of Law
Bos
ston Unive
ersity Scho
w

This paperr can be do
ownloaded w
without cha
arge at:
http://ww
ww.bu.edu/law/faculty//scholarship
p/workingpa
apers/2014
4.html

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434039

BOOK REVIEW
Common and Uncommon Families
and the American Constitutional
Order
Linda C. McClain*
STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Mark E. Brandon. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2014.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

INTRODUCTION: A FAMILIAR STORY ABOUT FAMILIES AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL O RDER ............................. 19  
BRANDON·S CONSTITUTIONAL STORY ................................... 21  
UNCOMMON FAMILIES ......................................................... 25  
THE BATTLE AGAINST MORMONISM AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF THE MONOGAMOUS
FAMILY................................................................................ 30  
MODERN DEBATES ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND
FAMILIES ............................................................................. 33  
CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 35  
I. INTRODUCTION: A FAMILIAR STORY ABOUT FAMILIES AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

In his aptly named book, States of Union: Family and Change
in the American Constitutional Order, Professor Mark E. Brandon
WDFNOHV D IDPLOLDU ´VWRU\µ DERXW IDPLO\ values and the American
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO RUGHU 7KH VWRU\ JRHV OLNH WKLV ´[A]cross the ages, a
particular familial form has held³monogamous, heterosexual,
*
Law.

Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of
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permanent, and reproductive. This family is natural and has helped
establish and maintain a kind of ciYLOL]DWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ RXU RZQµ1 In
this story, ´[l]aw, economy, and culture therefore have historically
recognized [this family·s] fundamentality,µ but ´beginning in the
1960s, law altered the landscape on which this family had
traditionally flourished.µ2 Brandon offers as illustrative of this story
Mary Ann Glendon·s assertion that, beginning in the 1960s, ´ ¶legal
norms which had remained relatively undisturbed for centuries were
discarded or radically altered in the areas of marriage, divorce, family
support obligations, inheritance, the relation of parent and child, and
the status of children born outside marriage.· µ3 Critics of this
transformation view the Supreme Court as ´one culprit,µ since it
constitutionalized family and marriage, for example, through its
evolving doctrine of constitutional privacy.4 This ´jurisprudence of the
family,µ critics contend, ´weakened the institution of the family by
challenging the preconditions for sustaining its traditional forms and
functions.µ5 Such alteration in the constitutional landscape, on this
account, threatens to ´unravel the social fabric of the constitutional
order.µ6
To students of constitutional law and family law, as well as to
observers of contemporary political debates and social movements,
this ´storyµ will sound familiar. As I observed, in examining the place
of families in the political and constitutional order: ´The ideas that a
significant link exists between the state of families and the state of
the nation, and that strong, healthy families undergird a strong
nation, are animating a number of social movements as well as
governmental efforts to strengthen families.µ7 So, too, those who
advance rationales for ´defendingµ and ´protectingµ marriage against a
new definition that would extend to same-sex couples have appealed
to the idea that the American constitutional and political order have
rested upon a particular, unchanging form of family. Illustrative is the
testimony that former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney gave
during a congressional hearing on ´preserving marriageµ through a
federal marriage amendment, held in 2004 just after same-sex couples
1.
MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 2 (2013).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 1 (1989)).
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2006).
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began marrying in Massachusetts. Governor Romney referred to the
family unit as underpinning ´all successful societiesµ and as ´the
single most powerful force that preserves society across generations,
through centuries.µ8 He then asked: ´Should we abandon marriage as
we know it, and as it·s been known to the framers of our constitution?
Has America been wrong about marriage for 200-plus years?µ9
II. BRANDON·S CONSTITUTIONAL STORY
States of Union is a wry and engaging answer to these
rhetorical claims about an unchanging form of family and marriage as
well as the relationship between that form and our constitutional
order. Brandon ´tests some of the claims of proponents of family
valuesµ about the relationship between the family and the political
and constitutional order, or³to conjure his title³between the state of
the family and the state of the union.10 His title·s reference to ´states
of unionµ previews his skepticism about the appeal to one, unchanging
family form. Indeed, he explains that his book will ´offer discrete
glimpses into American familial households across time,µ an historical
examination that reveals that the ´history of family in the United
States³and how it came to be in the Constitution³has been a story of
change and contestation,µ11 rather than of a natural family
undisturbed since the founding until the social and constitutional
change beginning in the 1960s. These ´glimpsesµ are rich and
illuminating. Brandon makes a valuable contribution to our
understanding of the place of families in the constitutional order.
Moreover, by focusing on distinct types of ´American familial
householdsµ over time, the book valuably highlights the interplay of
family pluralism, legal regulation, and constitutional development.
In his focus on the ´American constitutional orderµ and on the
relatively late date at which the U.S. Supreme Court ´read a form of
family into the Constitution,µ12 Brandon·s book valuably complements
the story told in Nancy Cott·s excellent and informative book, Public
Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation.13 Cott·s thesis was:
8.
Preserving Marriage: A View from the States: Hearing before the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2004) (statement of Mass. Gov. Mitt Romney) [hereinafter Romney
Statement].
9.
Id.
10. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 7.
11. Id. at 7, 266.
12. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
13. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000). I
organized and contributed to a book reYLHZV\PSRVLXPIRU3URIHVVRU&RWW·VERRNLQWKHMRXUQDO
THE GOOD SOCIETY. Linda C. McClain, 7KH3ODFHRI0DUULDJHLQ'HPRFUDF\·V)RUPDWLYH3URMHFW,
11:3 THE GOOD SOC·Y 50 (2002).
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´From the founding of the United States to the present day,
assumptions about the importance of marriage and its appropriate
form have been deeply implanted in public policy, sprouting
repeatedly as the nation took over the continent and established terms
for the inclusions and exclusion of new citizens.µ14 Her book tells the
story of how ´[p]olitical and legal authorities endorsed and aimed to
perpetuate nationally a particular marriage model: lifelong, faithful
monogamy, formed by the mutual consent of a man and a woman,
bearing the impress of the Christian religion and the English common
law in its expectations for the husband to be the family head and
economic provider, his wife the dependent partner.µ15 The founders
viewed this form of marriage, Cott explained, as ´especially congruent
with American political ideals,µ including consent as the ´hallmarkµ of
representative government.16 Cott·s book explicated the tensions
between the role of monogamous marriage as a powerful political
metaphor and the ´gender orderµ that marriage helped to shape,
which included the common law model of the husband as the legal
representative DQG´headµ of the household and the wife as losing her
´civic presenceµ as she was ´absorbed into her husband·s legal and
economic persona upon marrying.µ17
States of Union, in contrast, emphasizes the relatively late
entrenchment of the monogamous nuclear family in the constitutional
order. Brandon reveals the complexity of the connections ´between law
and family,µ and how these have been ´simultaneously sympathetic
and antagonistic,µ depending not only on ´timingµ but also on ´the
form of family that·s at issue.µ18 Cott·s ´archaeology of American
monogamyµ begins with the founders· ´political theory of marriageµ
and then elaborates on how, under this political theory, the new
nation depended on monogamy19 and, at various points, ´[t]raditional
monogamy appeared to need bolstering.µ20 The most notable example
of such bolstering is the late nineteenth-century federal campaign
against the Mormons, memorably upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Reynolds v. United States (as I discuss below).21 Brandon similarly

14. COTT, supra note 13, at 2.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3, 7.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. DW  QRWLQJ LQ D FKDSWHU HQWLWOHG ´$Q $UFKDHRORJ\ RI $PHULFDQ 0RQRJDP\µ WKDW
´WKH)RXQGHUVKDGDSROLWLFDOWKHRU\RIPDUULDJHµDV&KULVWLDQPRQRJDP\ 
20. Id. at 105.
21. Id. at 105;; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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begins with the ´English ancestryµ of ´the American law of family.µ22
He, by contrast, emphasizes a perhaps surprising degree of pluralism
in forms of American households and, in his account, Reynolds and
similar cases indicate the relatively late entrenchment of Christian
monogamous marriage in the constitutional order. His book aims to
show reasons for skepticism of the claim that an unchanging family
form, and attendant family values, undergird the constitutional order.
His story, then, is of the coexistence of different forms of households in
America even before the founding, the different types of virtues and
values generated in those households, and finally, the different
regulatory approaches taken toward those families.
Brandon also reminds contemporary readers that, for the
founders and the framers, ´familyµ did not always have positive and
glowing connotations either as the seedbed of civic virtue or the
indispensable foundation for good morals. To the contrary, they
viewed certain types of families as problematic and sought to avoid
them: they rejected Britain·s institution of the hereditary monarchy,
and they also abolished certain feudal doctrines that permitted family
dynasties and the concentration of wealth and power within families
by restricting the alienation of land.23 Thus, Brandon explains: ´When
the Constitution appeared on the scene, neither it nor its proponents
said much about family, other than to worry about potential problems
of familial self-dealing within government and the need to inhibit the
rise of familial dynasties.µ24
While the Constitution did not say much about the family,
Brandon does grant that ´assumptions about the forms and functions
of families were in the background.µ25 He asserts that ´no single type
of family provided an exclusive form for nor fit with the polity,µ
explaining that distinct family types connoted distinct virtues and
values:
In fact, there were three prominent types for which one might have found support. One,
the Jeffersonian model, was an agrarian family of independent farmers residing on land
that was owned fee simple, free from bondage to lords, and congenial to the organic
localist production of democratic virtue. The second, Hamiltonian, model was linked to
commercial capitalist modes of production and to nationalist, liberal, and individualist
virtues. The third was the slaveholding family, apology for which could be traced to the
Bible, to sociology, and to a form of Aristotelian natural law. It was not strictly nuclear
in form, nor consistently monogamous in practice.26

22. BRANDON, supra QRWH  DW  HQWLWOLQJ FKDSWHU  ´(QJOLVK $QFHVWU\RI WKH $PHULFDQ
/DZRI)DPLO\µ 
23. Id. at 69²79.
24. Id. at 263.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 263²64.
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Brandon then offers what may be the most provocative claim in
his book: the slaveholding family ´came closest to enjoying explicit
constitutional sanction,µ27 or, as he puts it elsewhere in the book, ´the
Constitution acknowledged and even entrenched one particular form
of family: the slaveholding household.µ28 Pointing out that ´slavery
didn·t square neatly with republican values,µ he stresses that it was
nonetheless ´legally protected and, for decades after the constitutional
founding, slaveholding households were present in every region in the
country.µ29 Eventually, the ´intense political debateµ over slavery
would play a role in the ´breakdown of the constitutional order,µ and
the failed attempt at a ´second secession[]µ by southern states.30
Brandon·s book illuminates how part of the conflict over slavery
included conflict over what place, if any, slaveholding households
would have on the frontier, where there was a fourth family type, ´the
frontier family.µ This category might more accurately be called
frontier ´families,µ since there were ´several versions of the family on
the frontier, linked to distinct modes of production, from farming, to
ranching, to mining, to bourgeois trades and occupations that grew in
or around settlements that dotted the West.µ31 These families, he
argues, ´tended to strongly exhibit the colonial characteristics of
negotiated roles, equality (especially of gender), and exit.µ32 Indeed, by
necessity, frontier families manifested those characteristics even more
strongly than their eastern counterparts. Brandon explains that,
while American law ´retained elements of English law,µ including its
´disabling [for wives] doctrine of coverture,µ for families on the
frontier, harsh conditions challenged the ´eastern template for family
rolesµ and ´impelled departures from convention,µ with husbands and
wives taking on, respectively, feminine and masculine tasks and
shifting expectations within marriage.33 Brandon explains that ´[f]or
many years after the constitutional founding, the nation did not
decisively take sides in the competition between slaveholding families
and white nuclear families on the frontier.µ34

27. Id. at 264.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 81.
31. Id. at 264.
32. Id. Brandon here draws on the Carl Degler·VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHWhree characteristics
RI WKH ´¶modern American family·µ WKDW ´¶HPHUJHG ILUVW LQ WKH \HDUV EHWZHHQ WKH $PHULFDQ
Revolution DQG DERXW ·µ Id. at 114 (citing CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE
FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8²15 (1980)).
33. Id. at 114, 126.
34. Id. at 11.

2014]

COMMON AND UNCOMMON FAMILIES

25

Brandon·s claim about slaveholding families is perhaps his
most provocative because such a claim poses an uncomfortable
challenge to arguments that at the ´time of the founding of the
Constitution, it was widely believed that a certain form of
organization of family (the marriage-based family) was essential to
cultivate civic virtue,µZKLFKLV ´an indispensable prerequisite for any
republican . . . government.µ35 That family, on this view, ´was the
substructure upon which the superstructure of the Constitution was
erected.µ36 Proponents of such a view, for example, tend to omit
slaveholding families from their analysis and contend that the ´racial
familyµ supported by political leaders and policed by anti-
miscegenation laws in post-Civil War America37 was a corruption or
´captureµ of marriage to promote racist ideologies.38 By contrast,
Brandon points out that even an ´antislavery politicianµ like Abraham
Lincoln held ´racialist views of home and family,µ and argued that the
territories on the frontier should be reserved for ´free white laborers,
who want the land to bring up their families upon,µ thus avoiding
racial mixing.39
III. UNCOMMON FAMILIES
States of Union also offers glimpses of some ´uncommon
families,µ unconventional households that deviated from the nuclear
model of family, and examines the distinct ways that ´legal and
political institutions tended to deal with each form.µ40 Brandon calls
these families ´uncommonµ not because they were rare, but because
they ´departed from the legal template that the common law (broadly
conceived) presumed to impose.µ41 Indeed, Brandon finds it
noteworthy ´that these experiments were as frequent as they were.µ42
He also draws attention to how the experiments played out in
different regions of the United States: the ´seedbed for
experimentation was New England, [and] the expanding western
frontier became a place for transplantation,µ while ´southern soil

35. Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 350 (2003).
36. Id.
37. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 80, 101.
38. See Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the
´/RYLQJ$QDORJ\µIRU6DPH-Sex Marriage, 51 Howard L. J. 117 (2008).
39. BRANDON, supra note 1, at %UDQGRQDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDW/LQFROQ·V´SRVLWLRQRQUDFH
ZDVQRWVWDWLFµDQGWKDW´KHZRXOGJUDYLWDWHWRPRUHOLEHUDOYLHZVEHIRUHKLVDVVDVVLQDWLRQµId.
40. Id. at 264.
41. Id. at 151.
42. Id.
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tended to be inhospitable to these experiments.µ43 The institutional
response to these ´uncommon familiesµ entailed ´the gradual
nationalization and constitutionalization of the morality of family,µ44
culminating (as I discuss below) in the Supreme Court·s various anti-
polygamy decisions.
This review cannot do justice to the rich sketches Brandon
offers of a sampling of these ´uncommon families.µ Some elaboration
will afford the reader a sense of how these groups perceived family
and marriage and how the society around these groups perceived
them, sometimes precipitating legal and political responses. By
focusing primarily on groups whose communal families found their
roots in religious inspiration or teaching, Brandon makes the
instructive point that, ´far from being a source of social stability,
religion was the engine for radical experimentation in the forms,
functions, and values of family.µ45 Indeed, to pick up on the ´seedbedµ
imagery Brandon introduces, these uncommon families inspired by
religion seem to unsettle the conventional expectation³often traced
back to the founding³that both religion and the family would be
seedbeds of virtue undergirding America·s ´experiment in ordered
liberty.µ46 Through freedom of conscience and belief, then, ´[l]aw
provided a space in which a group·s associations and productive
enterprises might flourish.µ47 By the same token, perceived affronts to
sexual morality were a limiting condition on the degree of tolerance
for such experiments.
Brandon begins with communal families prior to nationhood,
which were ´ascetic, pietist, millenarian, and Protestant.µ48 While
some of these groups permitted marriage, they extolled celibacy as
they ´prepar[ed] for Christ·s second coming and for their own spiritual
rebirth in the kingdom of heaven,µ finding doctrinal support in the
writings of the Apostle Paul.49 Some forms of communal life, such as a
pietist group initially called ´the Solitaryµ and renamed (as it grew)
´The Community at Ephrata,µ included segregating men and women,

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 180.
46. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
DISCOURSE    ´WKHUHLVPXFKHYLGHQFHWKDW>WKH)RXQGHUV@FRXQWHGRQIDPLOLHVFXVWRP
religion, and convention to preserve and promote the virtues required by our experiment in
RUGHUHG OLEHUW\µ  0F&ODLQ VXSUD QRWH 7 DW  H[SODLQLQJ WKH ´FLYLO VRFLHW\ SURSRVLWLRQµ
advanced by Glendon and others that the founders assumed that institutions of civil society³
including the family and religion³would be seedbeds of civic virtue).
47. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 180.
48. Id. at 152.
49. Id.

2014]

COMMON AND UNCOMMON FAMILIES

27

who both lived in celibacy (thus ´suppressing erosµ).50 Interestingly,
married people joined this group, which repudiated marriage and
attributed ´the marriage stateµ to ´the fall of man.µ51 The group·s
communism (the sharing of property) did not trigger reaction by public
authorities, but instead conflict arose when the group resisted paying
a ´single men·s tax,µ contending that they were a ´spiritual familyµ
and should not be put in the same class as ´rogues and vagabonds.µ52
They were willing, however, to ´pay of their earthly possessions what
was just.µ53 The judge accepted the bargain, thus, Brandon quips,
´making Ephrata the first officially recognized same-sex family in
North America.µ54
This group also came into conflict with civil authorities in 1744
when the leaders, the Eckerlin brothers, constructed a building where
civilly married husbands and wives could give each other ´letters of
divorceµ in order to pursue ´spiritual celibate livesµ by entering,
respectively, the Brotherhood of Zion and the Roses of Saron.55
Following a civil investigation into these ´extra-legal divorces,µ
Beissel, the founder, ´recanted and ordered the couples to return to
their previously married lives.µ56 Brandon observes: ´Even on the
fringe of European settlement, the civil authority was jealous of its
control of marriage and divorce.µ57 Otherwise, the Brotherhood
engaged in many economic pursuits, with a ´diverse portfolio of
industrial venturesµ that brought ´an impressive level of material
prosperity.µ58
This emphasis on material prosperity is also relevant to
Brandon·s recounting of the Shakers, a communal group led by a
woman, Ann Lee. The group was ´forming in the wilderness of upstate
New Yorkµ just as Ephrata was dissolving.59 Lee migrated from
England to New York in 1774, just before the Revolution. Renouncing
´lustful gratifications of the fleshµ and ´distancing herself from her
marriage both psychically and physically,µ Lee, or ´Mother Ann,µ
50. Id. at 155.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 156.
53. Id.
54. Id. %UDQGRQ OLQNV WKH ´VLQJOH PHQ·V WD[µ WR 4XHHQ (OL]DEHWK·V DWWHPSW GLVFXVVHG LQ
Chapter 2 of his book, in sixteenth FHQWXU\(QJODQG´WRLGHQWLI\DQGFRQWURO¶PDVWHUOHVVPHQ·µ
Id.;; see id. at 51 (explaining that, in 1579 ´4XHHQ (OL]DEHWK LVVXHG D SURFODPDWLRQ DJDLQVW
¶5RJXHV DQG 9DJDERQGV DQG DOO ,GOH >DQG 9DJUDQW@ SHUVRQV DQG 0DVWHUOHVVH PHQ KDYing not
wherewith to live . . . E\DQ\ODZIXO/DERXURU2FFXSDWLRQ·µ 
55. Id. at 156.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 156²57.
59. Id. at 157.
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preached that the Shakers ´had already risen with Christ, but the cost
of resurrection was to ¶forsake the marriage of the flesh.· µ60 The group
survived the death of its charismatic leader in 1784. Its theology
embraced the equality of men and women in their ´rational faculties
and governing powerµ as a basic biblical tenet and viewed God as a
duality, including ´the likeness of male and femaleµ rather than a
Trinity.61 The Shaker community, moreover, would be a new spiritual
family, a ´marriageless family,µ for Shakers insisted that
´disorganizing [nuclear] families, and dissolving the ties of natureµ
were necessary to attain the ´gospel relationµ required of Christ·s
kingdom on earth.62 Brandon points out that the Shakers on the one
hand recognized monogamous marriage as a ´civil right and a civil
institution,µ but on the other as ´not an institution with a connection
to Christianity, properly understood.µ63 Thus, Mary Dyer, who
originally joined with her husband and their five children but
subsequently left, wrote and spoke against the Shakers as destroying
the family.64 Brandon notes that she unsuccessfully petitioned the
New Hampshire legislature for a custody order for her children, but
later obtained a divorce when the legislature passed a law providing
as a ground for divorce that a ´spouse [had] joined and stayed for at
least three years with a sect that professed that ¶the relation between
husband and wife [is] unlawful.· µ65 In granting the divorce, the court
observed that Mary·s husband, Joseph, by failing to cohabit with her,
´had failed in a duty that was ¶the great end of matrimony, the
continuation of the species.· µ66
Notwithstanding the Shakers· unconventional views about
marriage and their uncommon family form, Brandon reports that, by
the mid-nineteenth century, ´most Americans . . . extended to the
Shakers a sincere if sometimes grudging respect for the way of life
they produced.µ67 In words evocative of Chief Justice Burger·s opinion
in Wisconsin v. Yoder (speaking of the Amish community), Brandon
continues: ´If they were odd, they were productive, honest, and
essentially harmless.µ68 Some observers, such as Friedrich Engels,
went beyond grudging respect to outright praise for a group that
seemed capable of forming a well-ordered society without marriage,
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 164²65.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id.;; cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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´bourgeoisµ property, and without ´the laws of the land.µ69 Courts also,
Brandon observes, showed a ´surprising level of toleranceµ toward the
Shakers;; to illustrate, he notes the willingness of the Michigan
Supreme Court to define ´family,µ for purposes of an insurance policy,
as including ´any group constituting a distinct or social body,µ and
even ´whole sects, as in the case of the Shakers.µ70
As a contrasting example of a communal family that
´repudiated marriage and committed itself to sustained economic self-
sufficiency,µ Brandon discusses the Oneida community, which
´publicly parted company with the Shakers on the matter of sex.µ71
Instead of repudiating sexuality and ´the flesh,µ the Oneida
community founder, John Humphrey Noyes, articulated a vision of
channelling sexuality that included ´complex marriageµ (or non-
monogamy), male continence (refraining from ejaculating during or
after sex unless pregnancy was intended), and also the social control
of reproduction by ´stirpicultureµ (or ´the cultivation of the raceµ).72
Like the Shakers, the Oneida community espoused the equality of
men and women. These unconventional sexual beliefs and practices
brought the Oneida into conflict with civil authorities and religious
leaders at various points, Brandon chronicles, particularly with New
York Congressman Anthony Comstock. Comstock was responsible for
the Comstock Law, which criminalized the mailing of ´ ¶obscene, lewd,
and/or lascivious material,· including information about contraception
or abortion.µ73 Not only did that law bar a sizable segment of the
Society·s tracts, but ´[p]ro-Comstock forces . . . adopted resolutions
condemning the community as a ¶pernicious institution which rests
substantially on a system of organized fanaticism and lust,· µ and a
major convention of churches urged an investigation of the
community.74 Up until this point, the Oneida community had enjoyed
´stunning prosperityµ in its original and five additional locations and
had weathered various storms brought on by investigations into their
rumored sexual practices. Noyes proposed abandoning complex
marriage and holding onto economic communism to address the
group·s unpopularity;; although his proposal was ratified, the
community itself dissolved just a few years later, leaving only a
holding company.75

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

BRANDON, supra note 1, at 166.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170²75.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 177²78.
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Brandon sums up his analysis of these uncommon families by
noting that Aristotle recognized two ´naturalµ and constitutive
functions of the household: production and reproduction.76 Although
these communities ´might be intensely committed to a religious idea,µ
what allowed them to flourish in the long term was ´a practical
commitment to material sustenance and well-being.µ77 Remarkably,
the Shakers ´sustained their communities for generations,µ as new
members joined, even though they foreswore ´the sexual means
through which reproduction takes place.µ78 The Oneidas, also a highly
productive community, ´were badgered into abandoning their familial
experimentµ because of the concern of their opponents over, as
Brandon puts it, ´who was having sex with whom, and to what end.µ79
IV. THE BATTLE AGAINST MORMONISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ENTRENCHMENT OF THE MONOGAMOUS FAMILY
States of Union then turns to the Mormons, ´uncommon
familiesµ with a particularly significant place in ´the story of the
relation between families and the American constitutional order.µ80 As
he notes, the story of the rise of Mormonism in the United States, the
westward migration of the Mormons, and the federal government·s
campaign against polygamy and the theocracy of the Utah territory
has been told many times.81 So too has the denouement of the Church
of Latter Day Saints· revelation that it should discontinue the practice
of plural marriage and Utah·s admission to the Union, with a
provision in Utah·s constitution guaranteeing ´perfect toleration of
religious sentiment,µ while forever banning the practice of
´polygamous and plural marriages.µ82 Constitutional law and family
law casebooks excerpt Reynolds v. United States,83 perhaps the best
known of the U.S. Supreme Court·s many decisions involving the
Mormons. Brandon·s central point in this part of his book is that ´[t]he
resolution of the Mormon Question completed a process through which
the
monogamous
family
was
both
nationalized
and

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 181.
Id.
For an often-cited account, see SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (2002). For
%UDQGRQ·VDFFRXQWVHHBRANDON, supra note 1, at 180²210)RU&RWW·VVHHCOTT, supra note 13,
at 105²31.
83. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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constitutionalized.µ84 That process, which he describes in an earlier
chapter, ´had begun much earlier in the nineteenth centuryµ against
native tribes, whose family forms did not conform to ´the common-law
template.µ85 Brandon points out that, in both cases, Congress
perceived a threat to the political order from a way of life incompatible
with Christian civilization. Political rhetoric spoke of the
incompatibility of ´savage and civilized life,µ86 and of the need to ´kill
the Indianµ in Indians so they could assimilate.87 Federal efforts
(always disturbing to read) included compelling Indian children to
assimilate through attending off-the-reservation schools, shoring up
the ´manhoodµ and the work ethic of Indian men by dividing
reservation land into lots, and suppressing polygamy.88
With respect to the Mormon practice of polygamy, the trope
was that polygamy was tantamount to barbarism and incompatible
with Christian civilization. Thus, the Reynolds Court claimed that
polygamy ´has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europeµ and, prior to the Mormons, was ´almost exclusively
a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.µ89 The Court
famously linked polygamy to ´stationary despotismµ and monogamy to
republicanism. Brandon points out the ´several items of irony and
interestµ in Reynolds:
2QH LQYROYHG WKH &RXUW·V LQYRFDWLRQRI WKH VDFUHG WR OLPLW UHOLJLRXVO\ PRWLYDWHG DFWLRQ
$QRWKHUZDVWKH&RXUW·VRGGO\LQFRPSOHWHDFFRXQWRISROLWLFDOKLVWRU\ZKLFKLJQRUHGQRW
only monogamous despotisms but also the long history of concubinage among the royalty
DQG DULVWRFUDF\ HYHQ RI QRUWKHUQ DQG ZHVWHUQ (XURSH 6WLOO DQRWKHU ZDV WKH &RXUW·V
hand wringing over patriarchy, essentially declaring it be an un-American, despite the
fact that the United States practiced its own republican version of patriarchy. In fact,
Mormon Utah was one of the few places in the United States where women could vote.
7R EH VXUH WKHUH ZHUH OLPLWV WR ZRPHQ·V IUHHGRP LQ H[HUFLVLQJ WKDW ULJKW >WR YRWH@
supervised as they were by husbands and church fathers. But they did possess the
formal right³for a time, at least.90

The Supreme Court, Brandon details, upheld other federal
enactments directed at polygamy, such as the Edmunds Act, which
disenfranchised bigamists, polygamists, and cohabitors, and barred
84. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 210.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 143 (quoting Hiram Price, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on the incompatibility
RI´VDYDJHDQGFLYLOL]HGOLIHµ 
87. Id. at 146 (quoting Captain Richard Henry Pratt, who established the Carlisle School for
,QGLDQFKLOGUHQ´:HDFFHSWWKHZDWFK-word. There is no good Indian but a dead Indian. Let us
E\HGXFDWLRQDQGSDWLHQWHIIRUWNLOOWKH,QGLDQLQKLPDQGVDYHWKHPDQµ).
88. Id. at 142²50.
89. Id. at 205 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878)).
90. Id. at 206.
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them from jury service and from holding any appointed or elected
office in the territory. Once again, the Court stressed the vital
relationship between the form of the family and the ´founding of a
free, self-governing commonwealth,µ praising the family ´springing
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of
matrimony,µ as ´the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in
our civilization.µ91 Brandon details a litany of further Congressional
acts directed against the territory of Utah and against polygamy. In
Davis v. Beason, the Court rejected a claim that polygamy was
protected by the free exercise of religion and countered that ´[b]igamy
and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian
countries. . . . They tend to destroy the purity of the marital relation,
to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase
man.µ92 Brandon points out that, writing in 1890, the Court probably
had the Oneida community in mind when it warned of the
consequences of allowing the free exercise of religion to include
religiously motivated conduct: ´[T]here have been sects which denied
as part of their religious tenets that there should be any marriage tie,
and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by
the passions of its members.µ93 Brandon points out, again, the irony of
the Court rejecting a free exercise claim by taking a position that
resembled an establishment;; that is, that ´the general consent of the
Christian worldµ is that the punitive power of government may be
used against ´crimesµ that ´the tenets of a religious sectµ encourage.94
Just a few months later, Brandon notes, the Court upheld the
authority of Congress to ´repeal the charter of the Mormon Church
and seize the church·s propertyµ and, in so doing, referred to the
church·s ´nefarious doctrineµ of polygamy and polygamy·s spread as ´a
return to barbarism . . . contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of
the civilization which Christianity has produced in the western

91. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)).
92. 133 U.S. 333, 341;; see also BRANDON, supra note 1, at 208.
93. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 208²09.
94. Id. Subsequent to the publication of States of Union, a federal district court in Utah
VWUXFN GRZQ WKH ´FRKDELWDWLRQµ SURQJ RI 8WDK·V ELJDP\ VWDWXWH DQG UDLVHG TXHVWLRQV DERXW WKH
continuing vitality of Reynolds v. United States, as directed to that part of the statute. Kody
Brown et al. v. Buhman, No. 2:11-cv-0652-CW, slip op. at 11²12 and n. 11 (D. Utah, Dec. 13,
2013). The court concluded that Reynolds UHIOHFWV WKH ´HQWUHQFKHG QDWXUH RI DQ RULHQWDOLVW
PLQGVHW DPRQJ UXOLQJ HOLWHVµ LQ LWV ´H[SOLFLW ¶GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ :HVWHUn superiority and
2ULHQWDOLQIHULRULW\µSDUWLFXODUO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRreligious practices. Id. The court observed that
´WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV RYHU GHFDGHV >VLQFH Reynolds] assumed a general posture that is less
inclined to allow majoritarian coercion of unpopular or disliked minority groups, especially when
blatant racism (as expressed through Orientalism/imperialism, religious prejudice, or some other
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\VXVSHFWPRWLYDWLRQFDQEHGLVFRYHUHGEHKLQGVXFKOHJLVODWLRQµId. at 11.
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world.µ95 Several months later, the president of the church announced
a revelation that the Church should discontinue practicing polygamy.
Eventually, Congress released the Church·s assets, ´justifying the
release on the ground that the church had ceased practicing and
advocating polygamy,µ96 and President Cleveland signed the Enabling
Act allowing the People of Utah to ratify a constitution and join the
U.S. as a state, on equal footing with the original states.97
The polygamy cases, Brandon argues, exemplify one prominent
theme in the Court·s ´familial jurisprudenceµ: ´[T]he importance of
family in promoting and preserving a kind of moral order.µ98 To
reiterate his book·s claim, they are also significant as marking the
time ´when the Supreme Court bestowed its blessing on the national
policyµ of committing publicly to ´the monogamous nuclear familyµ in
the name of ´preserving civilization and progress.µ99 Brandon
insightfully adds that, although the Court insisted that ´the nuclear
family promoted two abstract values central to the American order:
liberty and equality,µ that commitment, arguably, was ´more
rhetorical than real,µ given the persistence of ´restrictive family
policiesµ and lingering of ´gender hierarchyµ well into the twentieth
century.100
V. MODERN DEBATES ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILIES
When it turns to ´modern times,µ States of Union adeptly
identifies certain tensions within the Court·s jurisprudence about the
continuing relevance of family to present debates.101 One benefit of
Brandon·s book is that his focus on the family in the constitutional
order brings into relief certain features of that jurisprudence that are
not as evident when encountering it, casebook style, in particular
contexts.
Perhaps the most striking tension concerns the Court·s
approach to governmental regulation of the family, which relates in
turn to tension over whether to trust families as vital sources of
social³and literal³reproduction or distrust them as units that may
undermine the political and constitutional order. As the polygamy
cases vividly illustrate, the Court has upheld federal governmental
95. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 209 (quoting Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 (1890)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 210.
98. Id. at 211.
99. Id. at 265.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 211.    
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efforts to prohibit family forms deemed inimical to good political order
and republican values (and, as well, to Christianity). As his discussion
of federal measures against the native tribes suggests, the federal
government perceived that forcing assimilation of Indians into nuclear
family forms and instilling proper ´valuesµ in their children was
necessary for Indians to continue to exist amidst a Christian
civilization. The founders and framers sought to prevent certain types
of families they viewed as incompatible with American liberty, that is,
feudal and dynastic families and hereditary, monarchical families.
Slaveholding households, Brandon points out, came closest to enjoying
constitutional sanction and yet, over time, the political and
constitutional conflict over slavery led to civil war. Opponents of
slavery compared it to barbarism, as bad as or worse than polygamy.
Brandon also puts in context the Court·s upholding of
compulsory sterilization in Buck v. Bell, which illustrates a
willingness to regulate and even restrict family formation on a view
that certain families will harm or weaken society. Shocking enough as
Justice Holmes·s language in Buck v. Bell (1927) still is, it is even
more shocking to read it separated by just a few pages in Brandon·s
book (and by a few Supreme Court terms) from the Court·s famous
anti-totalitarian rhetoric in defense of liberty (in parental and other
forms) in Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923, and in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, following in 1925.102 Meyer and Pierce feature in
contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional argument in support of
noninterference with the ´private realm of the familyµ (articulated in
Prince v. Massachusetts103 in 1944) and in favor of allowing families to
carry out their important tasks of social reproduction. As Brandon
details, Skinner, decided in 1942, articulated the basic right ´to have
offspring,µ linking it to the right to marry and warning of the ´far-
reaching and devastating effectsµ of exercising ´the power to
sterilize.µ104
The tension between the Court·s recognition both that there is
a ´private realmµ of family life and that the family is not immune from
regulation continues to the present day. James Fleming and I have
described this as a ´two-stepµ in the Court·s jurisprudence about the
regulation of the family, marriage, and parents: ´[F]ollowing quick on
the heels of step one³a declaration that something is ¶fundamental·

102. Id. at 216²17 (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
103. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
104. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 222.
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and ¶private·³is step two³a clarification that it is neither absolute
nor beyond regulation.µ105
Brandon illustrates how the emerging jurisprudence of
individual privacy limited states· ability to enforce particular family or
moral values through law. Complicating the story is the emergence of
sex equality in the Court·s Equal Protection jurisprudence, so that the
status quo in gender relations within the family upheld by the Court
in Bradwell v. Illinois (1873)106 and well into the twentieth century
became unconstitutional as the Court took a closer look at sex-based
classifications.107 If nothing else, claims about an unchanging and
universally understood meaning of family or marriage stumble in
confronting the contrast between the Court·s upholding of sex-
differentiated roles for husband and wife into the 1960s and the
Court·s repudiation of archaic stereotypes about D ZRPDQ·V place in
the home in subsequent decades. The Court·s evolving Equal
Protection jurisprudence, from upholding anti-miscegenation laws to
striking them down as embodying white supremacy, also undercuts
appeals to a timeless form of family recognizable to the founders and
yet threatened by more modern conceptions. In other words, the
intertwined evolution of the law of marriage and of Equal Protection
jurisprudence about gender and the status of women offers a powerful
rejoinder to questions like that posed by former Governor Romney at
WKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKLVHVVD\´6KRXld we abandon marriage as we know
LW DQG DV LW·V EHHQ NQRZQ WR WKH IUDPHUV RI RXU FRQVWLWXWLRQ" Has
America been wrong about marriage for 200-plus years"µ108
VI. CONCLUSION
Appropriately, States of Union concludes with an epilogue on
United States v. Windsor, in which the Court struck down Section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act ´'20$µ .109 DOMA itself illustrates that
strand of thought that Congress must act to preserve traditional
(Judeo-Christian) marriage from threatening forms of family³in this
case, marriage by two men or two women. In his dissent, Justice Alito
contended that Edith Windsor sought to have the Court ´resolve a
debate between two competing views of marriage,µ the ´traditionalµ or
´conjugalµ view and the ´consent-basedµ vision of marriage.110
105. JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 249 (2013).
106. 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
107. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 228²29.
108. Romney Statement, supra note 8, at 7.
109. Id. at 268²73 (discussing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
110. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Brandon argues that Justice Alito·s dissent relies upon the erroneous
view of marriage as fixed and³until recently³unchanged. Although
Justice Alito stated that the Constitution ´does not codify either of
these views of marriage,µ he also ´asserted that an original
understanding of the Constitution would likely support the traditional
view,µ111 which is of marriage ´as an exclusively opposite-sex
institution and as one inextricably linked to procreation and biological
kinship.µ112 Brandon points out several problems with Alito·s position
in Windsor, among them, ´his reduction of views of marriage into two
general types,µ when, ´[i]n fact, there is, and has long been in the
United States, a wide range of views of the point and purpose of
marriage, perhaps as many views as there have been marriages.µ113 In
addition, while Alito characterizes the consent-based view of marriage,
´a vision that primarily defines marriage as the solemnization of
mutual commitment³marked by strong emotional attachment and
sexual attraction,µ as ´very prominentµ in ´popular understandingµ
and ´popular culture,µ114 Brandon points out that certain Supreme
Court precedents (such as Turner v. Safley115) ´positively embrace a
companionate view of marriage.µ116 Another component of Justice
Alito·s argument is his assertion that ´the family is an ancient and
universal human institutionµ and that ´family structure reflects the
characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in
the popular understanding of marriage and the family can have
profound effects.µ117 Although Brandon does not discuss this part of
the opinion, it too reflects a static view of family that Brandon·s book
challenges. Consider, for example, the radical difference in the
prescribed and hierarchical gender roles of husband and wife in
English common law, adopted by the colonies and U.S. courts and
affirmed in earlier Supreme Court opinions, and the modern template
of marriage as an equal partnership. The joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey118 noted the shift from an earlier view of the
Constitution, of women, and of the family, which gave husbands
authority over their wives, to the contemporary constitutional
understanding of women, the family, and marriage.119
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BRANDON, supra note 1, at 269.
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482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715.
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Brandon·s concluding section on ´American Constitutional
Familiesµ usefully pulls together the central messages of his book.120
He observes: ´[T]he history of family in the United States³and of how
it came to be in the Constitution³has been a story of change and
contestation. . . . There has always been a plurality of views about the
point of and reasons for marriage.µ121 Monogamy, he acknowledges,
comes close to a ´constitutional modelµ of family, an ´officially
sanctioned institution,µ but even so, ´that has been contested, and its
form and function have altered through the years.µ122 Other than that,
he counsels, ´there is no constitutional ideal of marriage, nor of
family,µ but simply ´constitutional parameters within which debates
over marriage and family have played out.µ After all, America ´has
always been a place for experiments and for diverse ways of life.µ123
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